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FOR THE LAST several years, Braniff Airways (Braniff)
has faced increasing financial difficulties. On May 12, 1982,
Braniff took the final step of suspending operations and filing
a petition for reorganization,1 thus becoming the first major
United States air carrier to seek court protection from its
creditors.
In the aftermath of Braniffs collapse, concerns of future air
carrier insolvencies are increasing. With stock prices de-
pressed and interest rates at near record levels, many air car-
riers are experiencing difficulties meeting growing demands
for liquidity and for the financing necessary to purchase new
aircraft. The financial structures of many air carriers are seri-
ously overextended with debt. Given the potential cata-
strophic effects of such developments, a better method of
gauging the financial health of air carriers and the likelihood
of insolvency in air transportation is needed to protect inves-
tors and creditors.
Financial analysts have long searched for accurate methods
of predicting business failure. Recent research attempts in-
volve the use of predictive models which combine traditional
financial analysis with statistical analysis.' This article will
* Professor of Finance and Transportation, University of Portland, Portland,
Oregon.
' Braniff Files for Reorganization, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 17, 1982, at 29.
Braniff filed a petition under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1980).
If granted, this would allow Braniff to reorganize and resume operations under the
protection of a federal court.
2 See B. LEv, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYsIs: A NEW APPROACH (1974); Altman,
Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bank-
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apply a generally accepted model to air transportation in an
effort to appraise air carriers' financial strength and to predict
likely bankruptcy candidates. This analysis will aid in pin-
pointing the causes of the air carriers' financial difficulties and
should be of interest to airline management, creditors, and
regulators.
As background for this article, a brief treatment of the
financial patterns of the air carrier industry will be presented
to provide a basic understanding of the impact of air carrier
financing on solvency. The predictive model will be presented,
explained, and applied to the major carriers or trunklines, as
defined by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).3 The remain-
ing analysis will examine the results and explore the implica-
tions for the future of the air carrier industry.
I. AIRLINE FINANCING, 1960-1981
The economy, high interest rates, rising fuel costs, and fare-
wars have all interacted to seriously impair the profitability of
the air carriers and to force many close to insolvency.4 No at-
tempt is made here to minimize the collective impact of these
factors and they do influence the variables in the model to be
presented, but the crisis in the industry has not arrived over-
night, as some believe. These factors may be the immediate
causes of the industry's problems-"the straws that broke the
camel's back"-but, in reality, the root or primal cause of the
problems facing the industry has been the financial strategies
followed by many of the carriers over the past two decades.
To secure financing for the acquisition of assets, air carrier
ruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589 (1968). See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
3 Section 416(a) of the Federal Aviation Act empowers the CAB to establish "clas-
sifications or groups of air carriers." 49 U.S.C. § 1386(a) (1976). Pursuant to this sec-
tion, the CAB has classified the following carriers, which are the subject of this study,
as trunklines: American Airways, Braniff Airways, Continental Airways, Delta Air
Lines, Eastern Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines,
and Western Airlines. See W. O'CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS
11-12 (2d ed. 1982).
To this list, some would add the deregulation of the industry introduced by the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (Supp IV 1980)). This author, however, would not
include this factor for reasons that will come evident later in the paper.
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management has basically only two choices. Management may
finance with debt or with equity (stock or retained earnings).'
Debt financing entails risk while equity financing is conserva-
tive. The airlines have traditionally, with some exceptions,
chosen the former method of finance. Whether this strategy
has been wise is now open to question.
The decision to choose debt or equity is complicated, but
some guidelines are generally accepted. The airline industry
has always been highly leveraged in the operating sense, be-
cause air carriers face significant fixed operating costs that are
inherent in the nature of the industry. These costs do not
vary as output or revenues change; therefore, operating prof-
its, often called earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT),
and operating rates of return on assets (EBIT/Total Assets)
will be more unstable than in industries characterized by
lower fixed costs.' The traditional vulnerability of the air
transportation industry to recessions further increases this in-
stability. An industry facing such conditions should therefore
follow more conservative financial strategies." The use of debt
finance, or financial leverage, is risky because a fixed charge
Many carriers have chosen leasing as arguably a third alternative. However, the
traditional aircraft lease is a financial lease in nature and therefore is the equivalent
of long-term debt finance. They are treated as such for the purposes of this study.
See Gritta, Capitalizing Net Lease-Rentals: A Comment, MGMT. AcCT., Nov. 1974,
at 37-39.
" The only purpose of this section is to briefly summarize the carriers' financial
patterns. For a more complete treatment of optimal financing, See J. WESTON & E.
BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 550-86, (7th ed. 1981); Taggart, A Model of Corpo-
rate Financing Decisions, 34 J. FIN. 931 (1979).
7 All enterprises experience two types of leverage: operating and financial. Operat-
ing leverage results from high fixed costs (such as the purchase of airplanes); financial
leverage largely results from high interest costs. J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note
6, at 550-74. See J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 331-334 (5th ed.
1961).
8 See, e.g., Pakkala, Fixed Costs Impact Earnings Prediction, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
(Jan.-Feb., 1979), at 46. For the theory behind cost structure, and the effect of fixed
costs, see J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 6, at 571-74. For the resulting insta-
bility in the airline industry, see Gritta, The Effect of Financial Leverage on Air
Carrier Earnings-A Break-Even Analysis, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1979, at 53.
' This is, of course, a basic principle of finance discussed in most finance texts.
See, e.g., ARCHER, G. CHOATE, G. RACETTE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 227-56 (1979), J.
VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 261-92 (9th ed. 1980); J. WESTON &
E. BRIGHAM, supra note 6, at 550-86.
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(interest) increases and acts to further heighten the variability
of net profits and the return on equity(re). This is because the
return on equity is linked to the return on assets (ro) through
a debt/equity ratio (D/E).10 A simple formula will help
demonstrate this concept:
re = ro + (ro-i)D/E 11
The interest rate on debt is i. This formula simply states that
the return on equity is equal to the return on assets plus a
factor of the differential between the return on assets and the
cost to finance those assets times the debt/equity ratio.
The danger involved with debt finance may be seen from
the equation. An example will help illustrate this point. As-
sume the existence of three hypothetical air carriers: A, B, and
C. Carrier A employs a conservative financial strategy; using
no debt finance. 12 C, on the other hand, follows a liberal strat-
egy and employs three dollars of debt for every one dollar of
equity it raises (either internally or externally). Carrier B pur-
10 The debt-to-equity ratio is simply the ratio of total debt (current liabilities and
long-term debt) to equity or net worth (all the common stock accounts and retained
earnings). J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 6, at 140-41.
" See id. at 107, 552. This formula is developed from a typical income statement.
Assume a firm has $1.0 million in assets, financed half by equity and half by debt
(with an interest rate of 8%). Assume also that the firm earns a pre-tax return on
assets of 20%. Its EBIT level will therefore be $200,000 or 20% of the $1.0 million. If
the tax rate is 50%, for simplicity, the income statement will look like this:
EBIT $200.0
- i (at 8%) 40.0
Profit Before Taxes 160.0
-Taxes 80.0
Net Profit $80.0
The rate of return on net worth (which is $500,000) is therefore equal to $80.0/$500.0
or 16.0%. This can be found directly via a formula:
re=[ro + (re-i) D/E 1 (1-t)
re-[2 0% + (20%-8%) 500/500 ] (1-.50)
re-16%
Many airlines currently are losing money and their effective tax rate (t) is 0%, and
therefore the formula can be reduced for purposes of illustration to that in the text.
Is Of course, some debt finance would always be necessary, for all firms have at
least some short-term debt (i.e. current liabilities).
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sues a middle course and employs one dollar of debt for every
dollar of equity. Assume also that all the carriers have the
same operating profitability (ro or EBIT/TA) of 20% and that
all have an interest rate cost of 10%.3 A, B, and C's returns
on equity will be as follows:
A: re=20% + (20%-10%)0=20%
B: re-=20% + (20%-10%)1=30%
C: re=20% + (20%-10%)3=50%
Because the return on assets exceeds the interest rate, clearly
carrier C will report the greatest profitability. However, C
pays a high price for this potential. Air carriers face unstable
operating profit levels; accordingly, if ro decreases from 20%
to 19%, carrier A's re will decrease by only 1%, the same per-
centage decline as its operating return has declined. Carrier
B's re, however, will fall by 2% (to 28%), and C's by 4% (to
46%). Thus, as the D/E ratio increases, the variability given a
1% change in ro increases. Furthermore, should either ro de-
cline below i or i increase above ro, as both have in recent
years, leverage will become negative, and as the equation sug-
gests, rates of return on equity will be higher and less volatile
in the case of carrier A."'
Debt finance, therefore, presents opportunities for higher
rates of return, but it also increases risk, especially in the face
of volatile operating profits. The ultimate risk is, of course,
that should operating returns decrease sufficiently or should
interest rates increase sharply, an air carrier may not be able
to pay interest charges and therefore may become insolvent.
The debt/equity ratio thus becomes an important measure of
financial risk and a gauge of bankruptcy probabilities.
Chart I, which presents actual debt/equity ratios for the air
" In reality, interest rates would increase as the D/E ratio increases. Because of
increased risks, lenders would demand higher returns on their money. For simplicity,
a constant interest rate is assumed here.
1' If ro fell to 10% and interest rates increased to 15%, for example, carrier A's r
would fall to 10%, but B's and C's rates of return on equity would fall to 5% and
-5%, respectively. Because the factor(ro-i) is now negative, the impact of the leverage
is unfavorable.
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carriers for the period 1960 to 1981, illustrates the tremendous
risk facing the air carrier industry. Note especially the 1981
ratios for Braniff (8.22), Continental (5.12), Eastern (4.50),
TWA (3.91), and Western (3.92). These air carriers continu-
ally employed debt to finance expansion over the past twenty
years, as their increasing debt/equity ratios indicate. During
this period, Braniff became particularly overleveraged; its
debt/equity ratio increased from 1.54, the second lowest ratio
in 1960, to 8.22, the highest of the group in 1981." At the time
of this analysis, Braniff had total debt of $887.5 million with
an asset base of only $995.7 million, while its total interest
charges reached $60.5 million."8 The conservative strategies
followed by both Northwest and Delta are also interesting.
Their debt ratios were 0.87 and 1.25, respectively. Delta, in
particular, has chosen to finance rather conservatively."'
is One might wonder why lenders kept financing a carrier losing money like Bran-
iff. Most long-term airline debt is held by large financial institutions and collateral-
ized by aircraft, and with the unfavorable market in used jets, these financial institu-
tions were reluctant to move to force payment on debt. Many bankers probably felt
that the CAB would never permit a bankruptcy to occur, and, moreover, the air carri-
ers needed further funds to continue operations, so the institutions, hoping that con-
ditions in the future would improve favorably, simply kept advancing money to
Braniff and other similarly affected air carriers.
'0 The data from Braniff's income statment and balance sheet was reprinted in:
C.A.B., AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS, (Sept. 1981).
" These two carriers' higher profits, resulting from strong cost controls and
favorable route structures, undoubtedly allowed them to finance more conservatively.
They could rely upon internally generated equity and, therefore, did not need to re-
sort to debt finance. Cash flows were sufficient to meet most demands for funds. See
Rothmeier, The Effects of Financial Leverage on Air Carrier Earnings: A Break
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CHART II











































* The arithmetic mean or average for the years, 1972-1981.
* The standard deviation around the arithmetic mean.
SOURCE: Calculated from raw data contained in the Value












Chart II illustrates the impact of the carriers' financial poli-
cies on their returns on equity. As expected, the highly lever-
aged air carriers, Braniff, Continental, Eastern, TWA, and
Western, have wide swings in their rates of profit as measured
by the large ranges and high standard deviations of their re-
turns. Braniff's rate of return on equity, for example, ranged
from -126% (in 1981) to 18.1%, and its standard deviation
was an incredible 47.6%, while Continental's and Western's
ranges and standard deviations were also significant (-80.2%
to 21.5% with a standard deviation of 28.3% for Continental
and -52.3% to 19.4% with a deviation of 22.4% for Western).
Contrast these figures to those of Delta and Northwest and
the volatility penalty paid for using excessive levels of debt is
obvious.
The negative or low average rates of return for those carri-
ers high in debt is also significant. Braniffs and Continental's
rates of return averaged -4.2% and -4.7%, respectively, as op-
posed to Delta's 14.8% and Northwest's 7.1%. Although the
rate of return on equity does not appear in the model to fol-
low, it will become clear in the next section of the paper that
this poor profitability has affected both the liquidity and stay-
ing power of these airlines, as evidenced by several key inputs
into the model. With the background provided in this section,
the model now will be introduced.
II. THE ALTMAN MODEL
Financial analysts have traditionally measured financial
strength by key ratios that gauge liquidity (the ability to pay
obligations as they come due), leverage (the use of debt
finance), turnover (the efficiency of asset use), and profitabil-
ity, in an effort to predict future financial developments. 8
Little empirical evidence, however, had actually linked these
ratios to the successful prediction of corporate failure. Early
research by W. Beaver in the mid-1960's attempted to statisti-
cally correlate ratios to subsequent failure using single varia-
18 See Horrigan, A Short History of Financial Ratio Analysis, 43 Acmr. R. 284
(1968).
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ble models." His attempts were a major improvement on the
existing analysis. Edward Altman further improved on these
models by combining groups of ratios into a multivariate
model using five variables with greater predictive powers. The
use of this model and its application to the aviation industry
is the subject of this article.2 0 Altman based his original re-
search upon a sample of 66 Dun & Bradstreet manufacturing
firms with asset sizes up to $25 million, half of which had be-
come insolvent in the period up to 1965.21 He later extended
and statistically validated the model on much larger firms, in
different industries, and for different time horizons.
22
Altman's model has not been without critics. R.C. Moyer
has argued that the predictive ability of Altman's model is
lower when applied to time horizons different from Altman's
original study and for firms of different asset size. 23 Moyer
also suggested that a simpler model with fewer variables may
perform as well as Altman's original five variable model.2'
Other analysts have criticized Altman's statistical technique
of testing his model using hold-out samples from the original
time horizion, as opposed to validating the model on a sample
" See Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, J. ACCT. RESEARCH 71
(1966).
,o See Altman, supra note 2, for the original proposal of Altman's model in 1968.
For Altman's subsequent work on this subject, see ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
IN AMERICA (1971); Altman, Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America, BELL J. OF
EcON. & MGMT. Sci., Spring 1973, at 184; Altman, Haldeman & Narayaran, Zeta
Analysis: A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations, 1 J. OF BANK-
ING & FIN., June 1977, at 29; Altman & McGough, Evaluation of a Company as a
Going Concern, J. OF ACCT., Dec. 1974, at 50.
" Altman, supra note 2, at 593.
" See, e.g., Altman, Predicting Railroad Bankruptcies in America, BELL J. OF
ECON. & MGMT. Sci., Spring 1973, at 184-211; Altman & Lafleur, Managing a Return
to Financial Health, J. OF Bus. STRATEGY, Summer 1981, at 47; Altman & McGough,
Evaluation of a Company as a Going Concern, J. OF ACCT., Dec. 1974, at 50.
'3 See Moyer, Forecasting Financial Failure: A Re-Examination, FIN. MGMT.,
Spring 1977 at 11.
2 Id. at 12. Using data on 54 firms (half of which failed) with asset sizes up to $1
billion, and updating the time horizon to the 1965-1975 period, Moyer maintained
that Altman's overall success rate of prediction falls from 95% found by Altman one
year prior to bankruptcy, to only 75%. He achieves an overall success rate of 90.5%
with a "naive" model, which deletes two of Altman's variables. Id. Moyer did find,
however, that Altman's model had a very low error rate of classifying non-failing
firms as failing, id. at 16, which is, of course, the greater concern of this article.
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after the study period.25
Altman has countered the criticisms of his model and de-
fended its application. In answer to the criticism that the
model needed to be updated beyond the original testing
perod, Altman applied the model to larger firms for the period
of 1970-73 and achieved an 82% overall success rate.2 In ad-
dition, Altman retested his model on Moyer's 1965-75 sample
of manufacturing, retailing and service firms and found an
overall success rate of over 82% in predicting bankruptcies,
thereby rebutting Moyer's criticism that a simpler model
achieves results equal to Altman's more complex model.2 7 In
response to the criticism of his statistical methods, Altman
has argued that using new data from the same sample period
does provide a valid test of the model and its individual com-
ponent measures and parameters and does not limit the use-
fulness of the model in predicting insolvency.2 In sum, Alt-
man's model with its subsequent updating and testing
remains the most widely used model in predicting corporate
bankruptcy.2 9
Altman's model isolated five important ratios demonstrated
to be consistent predictors in several studies of corporate
bankruptcy.30 These five ratios are:
" See Joy & Tollefson, On the Financial Applications of Discriminate Analysis,
10 J. OF FIN. & QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS 723 (1975). Joy and Tollefson maintained that
Altman should have employed a non-linear (quadratic) form of his multiple discrimi-
nant model, as well as the linear form he used. Id. at 773-75. See infra note 36.
26 Altman & McGough, Evaluation of a Company as a Going Concern, J. OF Accr.
Dec. 1974, at 50.
'7 Altman, Examining Moyer's Re-examination of Forcasting Financial Failure,
FIN. MGMT., Winter 1978 at 76. This sample included the Penn-Central and Leigh
Valley railroads. Id. at 78.
" Altman & Eisenbeis, Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis: A Clari-
fication, 13 J. OF QUANTITIVE & FIN. ANALYSIS 185 (1978). Altman has also answered
the question concerning the appropriateness of a linear, versus a quadratic, model.
See supra note 25. Altman found no difference in the predictive ability of either form
of multiple discriminate analysis. See Altman, A Financial Early Warning System
for Over-the-Counter Broker-dealers, 31 J. OF FIN. 1201 (1976).
"9 See, e.g., E. SOLOMON & J. PRINGLE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGE-
MENT 122 (2d ed. 1980); J. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy 691-4 (5th
ed. 1980), J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 6, at 192-94; Altman & LaFleur,
Managing a Return to Financial Health, J. OF Bus. STRATEGY, Summer 1981, at 47.
SO See, Altman, supra note 2, at 594.
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1. The working capital to total asset ratio (WC/TA), which is a
liquidity measure. Working capital is defined as current assets
less current liabilities. Altman argues that the higher this ratio,
and therefore the more liquid the firm, the lower the
probability of insolvency."1
2. The retained earnings to total asset ratio (RE/TA) is a mea-
sure of accumulated past profits to assets. As a measure of
"staying power," when this ratio is high bankruptcy is less
likely to occur.2
3. The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total as-
sets (EBIT/TA) is a measure of a firm's basic return on assets.
High ratios indicate decreased risk."3
4. The market value of equity to book value of debt ratio
(MVE/BVD) is a gauge of financial leverage. This ratio is an
inverted variation of the debt/equity ratio discussed in the pre-
vious section. Lower ratios decrease insolvency risk. 4
5. The sales to total asset ratio (S/TA), often called the capital
turnover ratio, which is a measure of a firm's productive use of
assets. High ratios are favorable.8
Altman combined these five ratios through an applied re-
gression technique known as multiple discriminant analysis, 6
a' Id.
*' Id. at 595.
Id.
34 Id. Not only is Altman's ratio inverted, but it employs the market value of eq-
uity (the price times the number of shares) instead of book values or balance sheet
values to a company. While this ratio differs from the traditional ratio used by bank-
ers and financial analysts, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, it measures the
same variable, financial leverage. Altman found his version better fit the model. See
id at 594.
8 Id. at 596.
Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is a statistical technique involving the
correlation statistically of key variables (called independent variables) with a variable
to be predicted (the dependent variable). See id. at 590-93. The dependent variable is
an index that allows classification of an observation into one of several a priori group-
ings in this case, failed versus successful firms. The MDA technique derives a linear
combination of the characteristics that best discriminate between the groups (that is,
those discriminations that minimize the probability of misclassifications). Altman ap-
plied twenty-two financial ratios, five of which were found to contribute most to the
predictive model. The slope terms (e.g. .012) are the result of Altman's evaluation of
the relative statistical signifigance and intercorrelation of the variables. Id. at 594.
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into the following predictive model:37
Z=.012X I + .014X 2 + .033X 3 + .006X 4 + .999X 5
where X1 -X5 are the above five ratios. The objective function,
or Z score, is an index which Altman maintains is of consider-
able use in both forecasting bankruptcy several years in ad-
vance and in assessing overall financial performance. The crit-
ical values of Z are 1.81 and 2.99. A Z score of less than 1.81
indicates severe financial stress, a likely bankruptcy, while a
value of 2.99 or more signals a stronger financial position.a
Scores between these two extremes form the gray area, or
"zone of ignorance," where classification is more difficult."
Chart III applies the Altman Model to the trunklines for
the years 1978, a year of increasing profits, and 1981, a year of
financial difficulties. The first four ratios are expressed as per-
centiles so that a ratio of 50/100 is input as 50.0%, a ratio of
100/100, as 100.0%, etc. The final ratio is input as a decimal.
Thus, 100/100 becomes 1.00. The Z scores are presented in the













s9 Not one firm with a Z score of 1.81 or less survived, while no firm with a Z score
of 2.99 or more failed. The "zone of ignorance" included both types. Id.
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Two facts are clear. First, there has been a sharp deterioration
in all the air carriers' Z scores. Second, three air carriers now
fall below the critical Z score of 1.81.
In 1978, the industry's profitability was increasing and the
Z scores reflected this situation. Although only Delta (4.18)
and Northwest (3.14) had Z scores substantially above the
2.99 zone, all of the remaining air carriers were above the 1.81
cutoff. By 1981, however, the situation had changed dramati-
cally. The model has successfully predicted the bankruptcy of
Braniff for the air carrier has the lowest Z score in the sam-
pling (0.090). The model also predicts trouble for both Conti-
nental and Western. Several other air carriers have fallen per-
ilously close to the danger point. TWA, for example, has a Z
score of only 1.86.
Given the deterioration of the Z scores, the causes of the
decline need to be considered. Altman found variables X3 (the
return on assets) and X4 (the leverage measure) to be two of
the most statistically significant variables in predicting
bankruptcy.40
The return on assets variable (X3) is heavily weighted in
the model, and few would doubt that the lack of profitability
is the immediate cause of the industry's problems. In particu-
lar, the plight of Braniff, Continental, and Western is evi-
denced by the fact that their returns on assets turned nega-
tive in 1981. Braniff's return fell from 11.8% (in 1978)
to-9.9%, Continental's declined from 11.1% to -2.0%, and
Western's slid from 11.4% to -0.1%. Certainly, rising fuel
costs hurt these air carriers, as did the growing proliferation
of discount fares. In 1981, the cost of a gallon of fuel rose to
an average of $1.02, up 16.7 % over the prior year and up an
incredible 726.5% over the 1973 price.4'1 This increase dam-
aged the operating cost structures of the air carriers. Reve-
40 The importance of these two ratios to the air carrier industry was discussed
supra at note 10 and accompanying text. Altman found the three most statistically
significant variables to be X 3 , X4 , and X5 . Id. at 597. The latter variable was ranked
first in the combined model, but it does not appear to be as important in air trans-
portation, despite its weight and absolute size. In general, capital turnover in this
industry has been fairly good historically and it has increased since 1978.
,1 C.A.B., FINANCIAL SECTION, FUEL COST AND CONSUMPTION (Sept. 1981).
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nues were diluted by discounting and the percentage of reve-
nue passenger miles flown by all air carriers on discount fares
rose from 51% in 1978 to over 76% in late 1981.42 Indeed
these were several of the "straws" alluded to earlier. 3 But ris-
ing fuel costs and interest rates, and fare wars, affected all the
carriers relatively equally, and, as noted above, the volatility
in the return on assets is intrinsic in the industry because of
its fixed operating cost structure."" In a recession, returns will
decline. This was true before the tremendous surge in fuel
costs and fare wars. 45 The true long-term cause of the problem
therefore lies elsewhere; arguably in the leverage variable.
The debt ratio (X 4) remains far more critical, not only be-
cause of its weight in the model and its absolute size, but,
more importantly, because of the effects of the debt ratio on
volatile returns on assets noted in the prior section of this pa-
per.46 In terms of the model, Braniff's ratio decreased sharply
from 78.5% to 15.2%, and Continental's and Western's fell by
nearly 50% (from 62.4% to 34.8% and from 59.7% to 31.3%,
respectively). Contrast these figures to the debt ratios of Delta
(201.8%) and Northwest (182.6%). With interest rates in-
creasing, the debt burdens of most of the air carriers have cre-
ated the tremendous drain on the air carriers net profitability
noted on Chart 11. 47 This in turn is directly responsible for the
Air Transportation Industry Analysis, XXXVII VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SUR-
VEY 251 (Jan. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Investment Survey].
"' Certainly, Braniff's strategy after deregulation to expand radically its market po-
sition by going after dozens of new routes did hurt that carrier as the -9.9% return
indicates, especially as it slashed fares to gain entry into these markets. See Storm
Warnings, Wall St. J., May 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Again, no attempt is made to downplay these factors. They are important to the
crisis, but their impact would have been far less severe had the carriers been more
conservative in their financing.
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text. For Delta and Northwest, the weight
of the debt ratio in the model is very important because of the size of the leverage
variable. Even though the coefficient of the leverage variable is only .006, for these
carriers the leverage variable is large. For Delta, for example, .006 times 200.0%, (X4
in 1981) adds 1.2 to the Z score. The contribution of X 3 , the return on assets, is much
smaller though its coefficient is larger (.033 times 9.3%-see Chart III is only .40, the
contribution of this variable to the Z score).
4 In many cases, carriers floated long-term bond issues when the immediate effect
was to put them in an area of negative financial leverage. See supra note 8.
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deterioration in variables X 1, the liquidity ratio, and X2, the
ratio of past profits or retained earnings to assets. For most of
the air carriers, X2 declined under the influence of unfavora-
ble leverage. Braniff's ratio actually turned negative in 1981 (-
8.3%), while Continental's and Western's also dropped
sharply from 21.4% to 7.5% and 21.1% to 13.6%. Again, the
contrast to Delta and Northwest is striking. Their ratios stood
38.5% and 43.8%, down only very slightly from 1978.
At this point, some might still be tempted to blame Bran-
iff's problems on its over-expansion and argue that if the
economy had been better, Braniff would have survived. In the
Altman model a poor leverage variable can be offset by strong
operating profitability (X3) and high turnover (X5). However,
it is unlikely that this would have alleviated Braniff's
problems. Because of Braniff's over-expansion, variables like
X3 fell sharply, but it was still the leverage variable (X4) that
took Braniff's depressed operating profits and magnified the
losses greatly, thus leading to the insolvency.
Had the majority of the air carriers not employed such a
high degree of financial leverage, the situation would not have
reached crisis proportions. An air carrier with little debt may
operate unprofitably for a longer period of time than a simi-
larly situated but overleveraged air carrier. As the cases of
Delta and Northwest suggest, lower debt ratios have actually
been synonymous with higher and more stable net profits.48
The warning against excessive debt finance in any industry
suffering from volatile returns on assets is therefore very pain-
fully evident in the present state of the air transportation
industry.49
Some would lay blame for the industry's crisis on the der-
48 Financial theory would suggest the opposite. Risk and returns should be posi-
tively, not negatively, correlated. Greater risk exposure should be compensated for by
higher rates of return. Otherwise an enterprise will experience difficulties raising new
equity through the sale of stock. See J. WESTON & BRIGHAM, supra note 6, at 278-80.
4 In fact, most industries do attempt to balance risks. Industries that have unsta-
ble operating profits, normally use lower levels of debt finance. They do conform to
the sound "principle of finance" alluded to previously. For a study that contrasts the
airlines to several other regulated groups and to a sample of industrial firms, see
Gritta, An Unresolved Issue in Setting the Cost of Capital to the U.S. Domestic
Airlines, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 67,70 (1975).
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egulation of air carriers in 1978. This analysis, however, does
not appear valid. As the model illustrates, air carriers have
actually become more efficient since 1978, as evidenced by
their capital turnover ratios, X5. As noted previously, the sales
total asset ratio (X5) is an important measure of how effec-
tively management is employing its assets.50 High ratios indi-
cated greater efficiency or productivity. Without exception, all
the air carriers increased their efficiency as measured by this
ratio. " While deregulation did permit air carriers greater flex-
ibility and freedom in pricing, expansion, etc., it did not cause
air carrier management to make mistakes.5 2 Deregulation
merely substituted the market mechanism for government de-
cision'making. Deregulation did not force carriers like Braniff
to over-expand. Deregulation, on the whole, has prodded air
carrier management to be more efficient and competitive0 5
III. CONCLUSION
This article has briefly summarized the financial patterns of
the major United States air carriers and applied, to the indus-
try, a model which both measures overall financial health and
the danger of insolvency. The majority of the air carriers were
found to be financially weak. The model successfully pre-
dicted the bankruptcy of Braniff.
The causes of the situation were also explored, and the im-
pact of debt financing over time was argued to be the critical
long-term factor behind the problem, as it exaggerated the
impact of the more pressing short-term problems such as fuel
cost increases, the recession, and farewars.
Considering the results of the Altman Model, one may
" See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
61 It is interesting to note that Delta and Northwest were not the most efficient
carriers, as measured by this ratio. Northwest, as a matter of fact, had the lowest
ratio in both years, 1.16 in 1981 and 0.82 in 1978, though the latter was affected by a
strike as noted on Chart III. What separates these two from the rest is the magnitude
of the leverage ratio.
'" See generally Graham & Kaplan, Airline Deregulation is Working, REGULATION,
May-June 1982, at 26.
'3 For an articulate defense of airline deregulation, see Karr, Airline Deregulation
After Braniff's Fall, Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 20, col. 3.
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question the ability of certain air carriers, like Continental
and Western, to survive unless conditons improve. Both carri-
ers are now either in technical default of loan agreements or
in danger of being so, unless lenders relax constraints in ex-
isting debt agreements.5 4 Should the economy worsen, or in-
terest rates increase, the situation could deteriorate beyond
repair.
Several other factors must be considered, any or all of
which could aid the carriers in their battle for survival. First,
the demise of Braniff should help carriers like American and
TWA, who fly in direct competition with that carrier. TWA
and American have already begun to increase fares in markets
where Braniff engaged in fare wars. 5 The shock of Braniff's
insolvency may also serve to limit future fare wars. The re-
maining carriers should base their pricing strategies on eco-
nomic analysis, as well as marketing considerations.
Second, lenders are loath to force the air carriers into liqui-
dation. The worldwide market in used aircraft is already glut-
ted and prices are falling. Bankers know their best interests
may be served by being flexible in rescheduling airline debt.5 6
Third, fuel prices are stabilizing and interest rates are com-
ing down slowly. Both factors are important to restored profit-
ability and interest rates are crucial to the leverage factor.
Fourth, if the economy rebounds, traffic will pick up and the
tremendous built-up leverage of the industry will work in the
carriers' favor, increasing Z scores in the process. Fifth, con-
structive mergers could help. Should the situation worsen sub-
stantially, the CAB might be pushed into permitting mergers
between healthier carriers and the weaker in order to preclude
future insolvencies.
64 INVESTMENT SURVEY, supra note 42, at 252, 258, 277.
55 TWA, American to Raise Fares on Braniff's Lines, Wall St. J., June 3, 1982, at
2, col. 1.
H However, this did not help Braniff because its situation had deteriorated to
such a great degree. Lenders did attempt to assist the Braniff by twice negotiating a
deferral of principal repayments, forgiving some interest charges and waiving cove-
nants requiring Braniff to maintain minimum net worth levels. See INVESTMENT SUR-
VEY, supra note 42, at 251. Apparently Braniff concluded that its traffic had so de-
clined that unless it filed for reorganization creditors would start seizing the aircraft.
Braniff Files for Reorganization, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 17, 1982, at 29.
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For their parts, the air carriers can and must act to improve
their own situation. As the model suggests, leverage and oper-
ating profitability are crucial. Moves to cut operating costs
and excess capacity will help. The air carriers must become
more careful in their assessments of profit opportunities of ex-
panding into new markets. The key still remains, however, the
reduction of the tremendous built-up financial leverage in the
industry. The air carriers must seize every opportunity to re-
duce this leverage by choosing equity finance wherever possi-
ble to insure the long run viability of the industry.
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